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Abstract
I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money ()
to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear
and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data on
consumer purchases. However, in the short run  is approximately con-
stant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the constant  rationalization, which I argue should replace
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of con-
sumer behavior.
JEL Codes: D11, D12.
Go Cardinals!
It is the minimal requirement of any scientic theory to be consistent with
the data it attempts to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it
was revealed preference introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) that provided
the empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning
was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract
enough to be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods  even
if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in
the sixties, economics has moved beyond the invisible hand explanation of
how  even competitive markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of
this revolutionwas that ever since, most economic research has been carried
out in a partial equilibrium context. Of course, the partial equilibrium approach
does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held
constant (ceteris paribus...). In other words, there is a special commodity call
it money that reects the trade-o¤of moving purchasing power across markets.
As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium
is no longer the consumers preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them,
in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed
preference.
The bulk of this work was done during my visit at the Institut Castelló. I am grateful for
their hospitality. I also thank Caterina Calsamiglia, Dan Friedman and Philipp Kircher for
useful comments.
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1 A Motivating Example
Assume that there are two discrete goods, A and B, and two observations: when
the price vector is (p1A = 1; p
1
B = 3) the consumer chooses B, when the price
vector is (p2A = 1; p
2
B = 2) she chooses A. Intuitively, this does not seem to be
rational behavior: a decrease in the price of B has made the consumer switch
away from it. However, according to the accepted theory of revealed preference
(for a synopsis, see Varian, 2006) these choices are consistent with the consumer
maximizing a(n ordinal) utility function subject to a budget constraint: any
utility function that assigns a higher value to B than to A is acceptable.1 How
come? The reason is implicit in the denition of the hypothesis we are testing.
As each observation corresponds to a di¤erent decision, even if the preferences
are assumed constant, the budgets are allowed to vary. Consequently, there
seem to be too manydegrees of freedom: as we cannot reject the possibility
that in the second experiment the consumer had a budget less than 2, the second
observation is e¤ectively discarded.
To resolve this problem, I suggest that we should discard the notion that
the consumer is budget constrained, instead. To replace the budget constraint
 following Marshall (1890)  assume that the consumer is endowed with a
marginal utility for money, : Now both observations count and we have two
inequalities that need to be satised for the data to be consistent with our new
denition of rationality:
u(B)  1(p1B   p1A)  u(A)  u(B) + 2(p2A   p2B):
Substituting in
u(B)  21  u(A)  u(B)  2:
It is immediate that, despite having an additional constraint consistency can be
assured: as long as 2  21; there exist (cardinal) utility levels such that both
inequalities are satised.2 That is, if we cannot reject the possibility that the
consumer values money at least twice as much in the second experiment, the
data continue to be reconciled with the modied theory.
So far it seems that the two modeling assumptions are operationally equiv-
alent. Not quite so! Unlike budgets, the marginal utility of money is not mer-
curial: barring signicant shocks to lifetime(!) wealth occurring between the
experiments,  understood as the value of an extra dollar to the consumer in
the future should be (at least, approximately) constant across the observations.
Taking this on board, our consistency conditions become
u(B)  2  u(A)  u(B)  ;
which obviously cannot be satisifed for any  > 0:
Thus, appealing to the constant marginal utility of money, we can rene
GARP, so that the result of the test agree with our intuition. At the same time,
1Formally, the observations and the putative preference relation satisfy the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
2Note that, just as in the standard model, B will be revealed preferred to A.
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we have surreptitiously introduced a partial equilibriummodel of consumer
choice as the paradigm of rationality. In the next section we show that the
example generalizes.
2 The general model
We have T < 1 observations of a consumers chosen bundles, xt 2 <L+; at
price vectors, pt 2 <L++. The L goods in the choice set are assumed to be a
small subset of the ones comprising the consumers full, lifetime optimization
problem, but for simplicity the choice set is not further restricted.
Let atj = pt (xj xt) denote the pecuniary advantage of the (chosen) bundle
xt relative to an arbitrary bundle xj : Afriat (1967) has shown3 that the following
axiom is necessary and su¢ cient for the data to be consistent with the Hicksian
theory of a budget constrained consumer:
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP):4 For every or-
dered subset fi; j; k; :::; sg  f1; 2; :::; Tg
if aij ; ajk; :::; as  0 then asi  0:
The heart of Afriats argument is that the existence of positive numbers uk
and k; k 2 f1; :::; Tg that satisfy the following set of inequalities
ui  uj + jaji for all i; j, (1)
is equivalent both to GARP and to consistency with the Hicksian theory.5 Para-
doxically, Afriats inequalities developed to buttress the Hicksian model seem
more conducive to a quasi-linear representation than to the Hicksian one! Using
Afriats Theorem, it is immediate from (1) that
Proposition 1 If and only if the choices are consistent with the consumer max-
imizing a standard utility function subject to a variable budget constraint they
are consistent with the consumer maximizing a quasi-linear utility function with
a variable marginal utility for money.
Based on the example above, the quasi-linear representation seems to im-
pose more constraints on the data, rendering Proposition 1 somewhat counter-
intuitive. To see what is happening, rst note that
uj   iaij  ui  uj + jaji for all i; j () ui  uj + jaji for all i; j. (2)
In words, when all the inequalities are added together, each one appears twice in
the case of quasi-linear utilities, resulting exactly in the set of Afriats inequal-
ities. Second, the trick in the Afriat inequalities is that the observations with
3He assumed that all pecuniary advantages are non-zero. See Diewert (1973) for a general
proof.
4The terminology is due to Varian (1982). Afriat (1967) originally called this cyclical
consistency.
5See Fostel et al. (2004) for a clear and concise description, as well as alternative proofs.
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positive aij are not actually discarded, rather they can always be accommodated
by a judiciously chosen  vector6 and hence they never refute consistency.
A hasty conclusion from Proposition 1 could be that GARP continues to be
the litmus test of rationality even if in the denition of the latter the budget
constraint is replaced by a quasi-linear utility function. Such an interpreta-
tion would be based on mistaking the formal equivalence of variable budgets
and variable s for real equivalence. The Hicksian theory does not explain the
procedence of the budget. As it is just an arbitrary exogenous amount, we have
no basis to rule out that it takes all kinds of values during the period of observa-
tion of the consumers behavior. This is what leads to the characterization via
GARP and to the counter-intuitive classication as rational behavior of the
one in the example above.  on the other hand can be backed up by a robust
theory both as the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation and
as a rule of thumb (see Friedman and Sákovics, 2011, for a developed treat-
ment). Both justications coincide in that in the short run  is approximately
constant.7 As we will see, the constancy of  has major implications.
We wish to check when the choice behavior is consistent with the following
alternative theory of the consumer: she is endowed with a shadow utility for
money, ; and a quasi-linear utility function U(x; p; ) = u(x)   p  x : <L+ 
<L++<++ ! <; such that she strictly (weakly) prefers consuming x at expense
p x to consuming x0 at expense p x0 if and only if U(x; p; ) > ()U(x0; p; ):8
Moreover, she chooses her most preferred bundle without any constraint.9
Denition 1 We say that the cardinal utility function u(x) rationalizes the
observed choices i¤ there exists  > 0 such that for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg
u(xt)  pt  xt  u(x)  pt  x for all x 2 <L+: (3)
It is immediate that u(:) and  are only xed up to a (jointly applied) positive
a¢ ne transformation (just as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility). Therefore,
we can normalize the utility function by setting  = 1: Unsurprisingly, (3) also
implies that u(:) must be concave.
Replacing GARP, the following axiom will play the key role in the proceed-
ings:
Axiom of Revealed Valuation (ARV):10 For every ordered subset fi; j; k; :::; sg 
f1; 2; :::; Tg
aij + ajk + :::+ asi  0: (4)
6When the non-diagonal aij are nonzero, it is easy to show that given GARP the rows
and columns of the matrix can be relabeled so that all the subdiagonal elements are positive,
making a sequential choice of the appropriate s straightforward.
7 In the rst case, the main argument is that the current expenditure is negligible relative
to the rest-of-life one and hence the indirect utility function is locally linear. In the second
case, the consumer updates her rule of thumb only periodically, again resulting in a locally
constant :
8 It is straightforward to show that at the optimum,  = du(x)=d(p x); whenever the latter
is well dened.
9We discuss liquidity constraints in Section 3.
10Rockafellar (1970) calls this condition cyclical monotonicity (though in a situation where
the domain from which the nite ordered subsets are selected is a continuum).
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Note that ARV is a stricter condition than GARP.
In proving the representation theorem, the following object will play a key
role:
Denition 2 When ARV holds, let the indirect cost advantage be dened as
bij = minfaik + akt + ::: + asjg; where the minimum is taken over all ordered
subsets of f1; 2; :::; Tg that start at i and nish at j:
This denition is only meaningful if adding extra cycles does not decrease the
value of bij . However, ARV implies that bii = minjfbij +ajig  0 ensuring that
the bij are well dened. The interpretation of the bij is that they impose a bound
on the di¤erence between the utility values of xi and xj : u(xj) u(xi)  bij . It is
easy to see why. Consider the case of three observations; i, j and k. There are two
di¤erent ways of going from i to j : one is directly, imposing the standard (c.f.
(3)) constraint u(xj)   u(xi)  aij ; the other via k; imposing two constraints
u(xk)  u(xi)  aik and u(xj)  u(xk)  akj : Summing the latter two we have
u(xj) u(xi)  aik+akj ; implying that u(xj) u(xi)  minfaij ; aik+akjg = bij :
The argument generalizes trivially.
With this last observation, we are ready to present the representation theo-
rem:
Theorem 1 If and only if the choices satisfy ARV, they are rationalizable by a
cardinal utility function.
Proof. As u(:) rationalizes the choices, by (3) we have that for all i; j 2
f1; 2; :::; Tg
u(xj)  u(xi)  aij : (5)
Take any ordered subset fi; j; k; :::; sg  f1; 2; :::; Tg: Summing up the inequali-
ties corresponding to each consecutive pairing (i; j); (j; k) ; :::(s; i), the terms on
the LHS cancel out and we obtain (4). In order to show the converse, we will con-
struct a utility function that rationalizes the choices when they satisfy ARV. We
set the utility values for the chosen bundles at u(xi) = b1i and extend the utility
function to arbitrary bundles via u(x) = mintfu(xt) + pt  (x  xt)g: The two
steps are consistent: mintfu(xt)+pt (xr   xt)g = mintfb1t+atrg = b1r = u(xr);
where the second equality follows in two steps: rst, the minimizer could be r
and thusmintfb1t+atrg  b1r+arr = b1r; second, mintfb1t+atrg  mintfb1rg =
b1r; as b1t + atr  b1r for any t: It is straightforward to verify that the utility
function that we have constructed satises (3), with  = 1:
For easier referencing, we state the recovered utility function in a corollary:
Corollary 1 When ARV is satised, the choices can be rationalized by u(x) =
mintfb1t + pt  (x  xt)g; t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg:
3 Liquidity constraints and mistakes
The example above points to a clear procedure to relax the constancy-of-lambda
constraint. Instead of keeping  constant across all experiments, we could accept
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a small variation across the sample. For example, if we think of credit card debt
(one of the most expensive forms of borrowing) and bound the borrowing period
at one year, we get an upper bound of 20% interest, which corresponds to a 20%
allowed variation in : In the example this would mean that for p2B  2:6 we
would accept the behavior of our consumer as rational.
Even without thinking of credit, it is customary to allow for errors. Afriat
(1972) for example, proposes the Critical Cost E¢ ciency Index to measure the
size of deviation from rationality. Allowing  to vary within a range as above can
also be interpreted as allowing for errors. Note, however, that by Proposition 1
this correction mechanism is only useful for data that satises GARP.
4 Related literature
This is not the right place to provide an overview of the extensive literature
on revealed preference. I will only discuss the two papers I know that have
previously derived a cardinal/quasi-linear version of revealed preference.
Richter and Wong (2005) look at innite (linear) inequality systems and
provide a solvability criterion for them. One of their applications is how to
rationalize the choices of a consumer with a quasi-linear utility subject to a
budget constraint. They claim that the nite version of their Strong Axiom
of Solvability which is an extension of ARV to include strict inequalities 
rationalizes choices. Of course, in the context of observing actual consumer
choices the ability to consider innitely many of them is of scant value: the
consumer may have to do that but not the econometrician. In between their
quests for generality both in terms of applications and in terms of the number
and strictness of inequalities, they fail to emphasize the importance of cardinal
revealed preference in fact, they also apply their machinery for ordinal revealed
preference.
Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) address the nite observation case directly
(though still including a budget constraint). They claim that  a condition
equivalent to ARV is equivalent to rationalizability, by referring to a result in
convex analysis for the characterization of the subgradient correspondence of a
concave function.
Both papers have identied the correct necessary and su¢ cient axiom
for cardinal/quasi-linear rationalizability. Nonetheless, their proofs are less
than straightforward and they have not argued why quasi-linear rationalizability
should be the preferred requirement in empirical analysis.
5 Conclusion
State-of-the-art empirical contributions still use GARP as the litmus test of
consumer rationality (c.f. Blundell et al., 2003, Cherchye et al., 2009, Choi et
6
al.11 , 2012, Echenique et al., 2011). This should change.
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